The political problem

Several years ago, immediately post-crisis, I wrote a short article for Nature exploring new ideas about modelling economic and financial systems. I wrote about agent-based models and other similar ideas, nothing all that earth shaking really. In an early draft, I recall adding a section toward the end of the piece making the point that, of course, better models, better science, etc., would never be enough because ultimately policy making has an irreducible political element; financial crises can almost always be traced back to the political influence of powerful forces who shape policies to help themselves (or to try to do so), with little thought for the welfare of others. To my surprise, my editor at Nature took that section out saying something like "we'd like to stick to the science."

I thought that was unfortunate and hugely misleading. Corruption is real, and I really do think that no amount of better economics will eliminate financial and economic crises, because of the reality of politics. No avoiding it. Simon Wren-Lewis has a great post on this topic today, looking at why it would not actually be that hard -- conceptually -- to make the financial system more stable. The only barrier is the intimate connection between finance and politics ("quite frankly, the banks own this place" as U.S. Senator Dick Durbin once put it), which means that banks won't actually have to do things that might help the public good and the nation as a whole:

There is one simple and straightforward measure that would go a long way to avoiding another global financial crisis, and that is to substantially increase the proportion of bank equity that banks are obliged to hold. This point is put forcibly, and in plain language, in a recent book by Admati and Hellwig: The Bankers New Clothes. (Here is a short NYT piece by Admati.) Admati and Hellwig suggest the proportion of the balance sheet that is backed by equity should be something like 25%, and other estimates for the optimal amount of bank equity come up with similar numbers. The numbers that regulators are intending to impose post-crisis are tiny in comparison.

It is worth quoting the first paragraph of a FT review by Martin Wolf of their book:

“The UK’s Independent Commission on Banking, of which I was a member, made a modest proposal: the proportion of the balance sheet of UK retail banks that has to be funded by equity, instead of debt, should be raised to 4 per cent. This would be just a percentage point above the figure suggested by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The government rejected this, because of lobbying by the banks.”

Why are banks so reluctant to raise more equity capital? One reason is tax breaks that make finance using borrowing cheaper. But non-financial companies, that also have a choice between raising equity and borrowing to finance investment, typically use much more equity capital and less borrowing. If things go wrong, you can reduce dividends, but you still have to pay interest, so companies limit the amount of borrowing they do to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. But large banks are famously too big to fail. So someone else takes care of the bankruptcy risk - you and me. We effectively guarantee the borrowing that banks do. (If this is not clear, read chapter 9 of the book here.  The authors make a nice analogy with a rich aunt who offers to always guarantee your mortgage.)

The state guarantee is a huge, and ongoing, public subsidy to the banking sector. For large banks, it is of the same order of magnitude as the profits they make. We know where a large proportion of the profits go - into bonuses for those who work in those banks. The larger is the amount of equity capital that banks are forced to hold, the more the holders of that equity bear the cost of bank failure, and the less is the public subsidy. Seen in this way it becomes obvious why banks do not want to hold more equity capital - they rather like being subsidised by the state, so that the state can contribute to their bonuses. (Existing equity holders will also resist increasing equity capital, for reasons Carola Binder summarises based on the work of Admati and Hellwig and coauthors.)

This is why the argument is largely a no brainer for economists. [1] Most economists are instinctively against state subsidies, unless there are obvious externalities which they are countering. With banks the subsidy is not just an unwarranted transfer of resources, but it is also distorting the incentives for bankers to take risk, as we found out in 2007/8. Bankers make money when the risk pays off, and get bailed out by governments when it does not.

So why are economists being ignored by politicians? It is hardly because banks are popular with the public. The scale of the banking sector’s misdemeanours is incredible, as John Lanchester sets out here. I suspect many will think that banks are being treated lightly because politicians are concerned about choking off the recovery. Yet the argument that banks often make - holding equity capital represents money that is ‘tied up’ and so cannot be lent to firms and consumers - is simply nonsense. A more respectable argument is that holding much more equity capital would translate into greater costs for bank borrowers, but David Miles suggests the size of this effect would not be large. (See also Simon Johnson here, John Plender here and Thomas Hoenig here.) In any case, public subsidies are bound to be passed on to some extent, but that does not justify them. Politicians are busy trying to phase out public subsidies elsewhere, so why are banks so different?

There is one simple explanation. The power of the banking lobby (and the financial industry more generally) is immense, from campaign contributions to regulatory capture of various kinds. It would be nice to imagine that the UK was less vulnerable than the US in this respect, but there are good reasons to think otherwise. [2] As a result, the power and influence of banks and bankers within government has hardly suffered as a result of the Great Recession that they played a large part in creating.

This point bears repeating -- indeed, it ought to be repeated every day for the rest of the year. All the technical and semi-technical articles now being published about measures for getting at systemic risk and improved schemes for weighting capital and so on, however clever and interesting they may be, actually only serve to draw attention away from this most serious problem, which is institutionalized corruption plain and simple. If every finance professor wrote one article on this topic -- after all, shouldn't this really be THE main topic in finance today? -- we might one day get somewhere with fixing the financial system.

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Alan Greenspan's nirvana

I wrote a post a while back exploring some of the silliest things economists were saying before the crisis about how financial engineering was making our economy more robust, stable, efficient, wonderful, beautiful, intelligent, self-regulating, and so on. The markets were, R. Glenn Hubbard and William Dudley were convinced, even leading to better governance by punishing bad governmental decisions. [How that could be the case when markets have a relentless focus on the very short term is hard to fathom, but they indeed did assert this]..

Paul Krugman has recently undertaken a similar exercise in silliness mining -- in this case going through the hallucinations of Alan Greenspan. The Chairman of the Fed was evidently drinking the very same Kool-Aid:

Deregulation and the newer information technologies have joined, in the United States and elsewhere, to advance flexibility in the financial sector. Financial stability may turn out to have been the most important contributor to the evident significant gains in economic stability over the past two decades.

Historically, banks have been at the forefront of financial intermediation, in part because their ability to leverage offers an efficient source of funding. But in periods of severe financial stress, such leverage too often brought down banking institutions and, in some cases, precipitated financial crises that led to recession or worse. But recent regulatory reform, coupled with innovative technologies, has stimulated the development of financial products, such as asset-backed securities, collateral loan obligations, and credit default swaps, that facilitate the dispersion of risk.

Conceptual advances in pricing options and other complex financial products, along with improvements in computer and telecommunications technologies, have significantly lowered the costs of, and expanded the opportunities for, hedging risks that were not readily deflected in earlier decades. The new instruments of risk dispersal have enabled the largest and most sophisticated banks, in their credit-granting role, to divest themselves of much credit risk by passing it to institutions with far less leverage. Insurance companies, especially those in reinsurance, pension funds, and hedge funds continue to be willing, at a price, to supply credit protection.

These increasingly complex financial instruments have contributed to the development of a far more flexible, efficient, and hence resilient financial system than the one that existed just a quarter-century ago.

As Krugman notes, this can all be translated into ordinary language: "Thanks to securitization, CDOs, and AIG, nothing bad can happen!"

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The long history of options

I just finished reading Niall Ferguson's book The Ascent of Money, which I strongly recommend to anyone interested in the history of economics and especially finance. Some readers of this blog may suspect that I am at times anti-finance, but this isn't really true. Ferguson makes a very convincing argument that finance is a technology -- a rich and evolving set of techniques for solving problems -- which has been as important to human well-being as knowledge of mechanics, chemistry and fire. I don't think that's at all overstated -- finance is a technology for sharing and cooperating in our management of wealth, savings and risk in the face of uncertainty. It's among the most basic and valuable technologies we possess.

Having said that, I am critical of finance when I think it is A) based on bad science, or B) used dishonestly as a tool by some people to take advantage of others. Naturally, because finance is complicated and difficult to understand there are many instances of both A and B. And of course one often finds concepts from category A aiding acts of category B.

But one thing I found particularly interesting in Ferguson's history is the early origins of options contracts and other derivatives. The use of derivatives has of course exploded since the work of Black and Scholes in the 1970s provided a more or less sensible way to price some of them. It's easy to forget that options have been around at least since the mid 1500s (in Dutch and French commodities markets). They were in heavy use by the late 1600s in the coffee houses of London were shareholders traded stocks of the East India Company and roughly 100 other joint-stock companies.

Looking a little further, I came across this excellent review article on the early history of options by Geoffrey Poitras of Simon Fraser University. This article goes into much greater detail than Ferguson on the history of options. As Poitras notes, early use in commodities markets arose quite naturally to meet key needs of the time (as any new technology does):

The evolution of trading in free standing option contracts revolved around two important elements: enhanced securitization of the transactions; and the emergence of speculative trading. Both these developments are closely connected with the concentration of commercial activity, initially at the large medieval market fairs and, later, on the bourses. Though it is difficult to attach specific dates to the process, considerable progress was made by the Champagne fairs with the formalization of the lettre de foire and the bill of exchange, e.g., Munro (2000). The sophisticated settlement process used to settle accounts at the Champagne fairs was a precursor of the clearing methods later adopted for exchange trading of securities and commodities. Over time, the medieval market fairs came to be surpassed by trade in urban centres such as Bruges (de Roover 1948; van Houtte 1966) and, later, in Antwerp and Lyons. Of these two centres, Antwerp was initially most important for trade in commodities while Lyons for trade in bills. Fully developed bourse trading in commodities emerged in Antwerp during the second half of the 16th century (Tawney 1925, p.62-5; Gelderblom and Jonker 2005). The development of the Antwerp commodity market provided sufficient liquidity to support the development of trading in ‘to arrive’ contracts. Due to the rapid expansion of seaborne trade during the period, speculative transactions in ‘to arrive’ grain that was still at sea were particularly active. Trade in whale oil, herring and salt was also important (Gelderblom and Jonker 2005; Barbour 1950; Emery 1895). Over time, these contracts came to be actively traded by speculators either directly or indirectly involved in trading that commodity but not in need of either taking or making delivery of the specific shipment.

 Another interesting point is the wide use in the 1500s of trading instruments which were essentially flat out gambles, not so unlike the credit default swaps of our time (ostensibly used to manage risk, but often used to make outright bets). As Poitras writes,

The concentration of liquidity on the Antwerp Exchange furthered speculative trading centered around the important merchants and large merchant houses that controlled either financial activities or the goods trade. The milieu for such trading was closely tied to medieval traditions of gambling (Van der Wee 1977): “Wagers, often connected with the conclusion of commercial and financial transactions, were entered into on the safe return of ships, on the possibility of Philip II visiting the Netherlands, on the sex of children as yet unborn etc. Lotteries, both private and public, were also extremely popular, and were submitted as early as 1524 to imperial approval to prevent abuse.”

 One other interesting point (among many) is the advice of observers of the 17th century options markets to use easy credit to fund speculative activity. A man named Josef de la Vega in 1688 wrote a book on the markets called Confusion de Confusiones (still an apt title), and offered some fairly reckless advice to speculators:

De la Vega (p.155) goes on to describe an even more naive trading strategy: “If you are [consistently] unfortunate in all your operations and people begin to think that you are shaky, try to compensate for this defect by [outright] gambling in the premium business, [i.e., by borrowing the amount of the premiums]. Since this procedure has become general practice, you will be able to find someone who will give you credit (and support you in difficult situations, so you may win without dishonor).”

The possibility that the losses may continue is left unrecognized.

Or, of course, perhaps the possibility of continuing losses was recognized, and it was also recognized that these losses would in effect belong to someone else -- the person from whom the funds were borrowed.

These points aren't especially important, but they do bring home the point that almost everything we've seen in the past 20 years and in the recent financial crisis have precursors stretching back centuries. We're largely listening to an old tune being replayed with modern instruments.

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